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RIDING ON THE CERCLA-CYCLE:
IS THE THIRD CIRCUIT BACKPEDALING?
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. US.'
I. INTRODUCTION
When planning and setting out on a bike ride, you typically have
two choices when deciding where to go. You can take a traditional route
followed by many, or you can choose to be adventurous and embark on a
new, different route, in the hopes of it leading to a new, exciting place. In
its 2006 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. US. decision,2 the Third
Circuit chose to do the latter, by diverging from the path taken by other
Circuits of allowing CERCLA § 107(a) cost recovery relief to Potentially
Responsible Parties ("PRPs") for voluntary cleanup efforts, and instead
deciding to adhere to its own precedents and deny this relief to DuPont.3
However, upon reevaluating its decision in light of intervening U.S.
Supreme Court authority, the Third Circuit determined that it was time to
stop and "get back on track." In 2007, the Third Circuit joined other
Circuits on the path toward increased CERCLA uniformity in overruling
its precedents and allowing PRPs to seek cost recovery under § 107(a) for
their voluntary cleanups.4
This casenote begins by discussing the facts of DuPont and the
2007 breakthrough holding that realigned the Third Circuit with other
Circuits regarding cleanup cost recovery for PRPs under CERCLA §
107(a). The legal background surrounding the court's analysis is explored
next, followed by the outcome in the instant decision. Finally, this
casenote focuses on how the Third Circuit's 2007 DuPont decision
benefits CERCLA jurisprudence, the environment, and society at large.
'508 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2007).
2 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S., 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006).
3 Marina K. Greek, Will the CERCLA be Unbroken? E. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
U.S., 28 ENERGY L.J. 681, 685 (2007) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S, 460
F.3d 515, 543 (3d Cir. 2006)).
4 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 135. Other Circuits allowing § 107(a) relief include the Second
and Eighth Circuits. Greek, supra note 2.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., ConocoPhillips Co., and Sporting
Goods Properties, Inc. ("DuPont") together sought reimbursement from
the United States ("U.S.") for costs associated with hazardous waste
cleanup efforts at fifteen industrial facilities located throughout the United
States.s The U.S. jointly owned the sites with DuPont at various times
during World War I, World II and/or the Korean War, and both DuPont
and the U.S. contributed to the sites' hazardous waste pollution. 6 DuPont
voluntarily cleaned up the contamination at the sites, and brought suit
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") to recoup costs for its efforts and for the U.S.'s
contribution to the sites' pollution.7
DuPont filed suit against the U.S. in the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey under §§ 107(a) and 113(f)(1) of CERCLA,
seeking cost recovery and contribution, respectively.8  DuPont
5 Id. at 126-28, 130.6 Id. at 127-28; 130.
'Id. at 130.Id.; 42 U.S.C.§ 9607(a) (2000) states: "[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of
law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for [:]
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with
the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the




subsequently chose to dismiss its § 107(a) claim and "'recoupment' of
costs without prejudice."9  The District Court used the cleanup at
DuPont's Louisville, Kentucky site as a "test case" to gauge the viability
of DuPont's claim against the U.S.' 0 The U.S. moved for summary
judgment at the conclusion of discovery, alleging that DuPont had no
claim for contribution under § 113 of CERCLA because DuPont, a
Potentially Responsible Party ("PRP"), had cleaned up the pollution
voluntarily, without being sued or settling its liability for the Louisville
facility." The court granted the motion in favor of the U.S., stating that §
113 required a party to have been sued before that party could pursue an
action for contribution.12 The court also granted the U.S. judgment on the
pleadings for the other fourteen sites, stating that there was no indication
in the pleadings that the circumstances of the other sites would result in a
different finding.' 3
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stayed DuPont's
subsequent appeal pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc. 4  In Cooper, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a party could not pursue a § 113 claim if it had not been
sued under either § 106 or § 107 nor entered into a settlement.' 5 DuPont's
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under section
9604(i) of this title." Id.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) provides that, "[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other
person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this
title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution
claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable
factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish
the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action
under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title." Id.
'DuPont, 508 F.3d at 130.
'
0 Id. at 130-31.
" Id. at 131.
12 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §9613 (2000).
13 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 131.
I4 id.
1 Id.; Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 160-61 (2004); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607, 9613 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A)-(E) states: "(A) Any person who
receives and complies with the terms of any order issued under subsection (a) of this
557
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claim to the Third Circuit was fourfold: 1) CERCLA provided it a right of
contribution separate from § 113 relief, even without § 106 or § 107
liability; 2) CERCLA implied that, as a PRP, DuPont was entitled to
recoup a fair share of cleanup costs from another PRP, such as the U.S., as
set forth in § 107(a)(4)(B) or the federal common law, even without being
sued under § 106 or § 107 or settling under § 113(f)(3)(B); 3) it was error
for the District Court to not imply a right of contribution under CERCLA,
and that the Third Circuit's analysis in its prior Reading decision, upon
which the District Court relied, was undermined by the Cooper decision;
and 4) the District Court's granting judgment on the pleadings and
dismissing the § 113(f) contribution claims for DuPont's fifteen sites was
erroneous. 16
section may, within 60 days after completion of the required action, petition the President
for reimbursement from the Fund for the reasonable costs of such action, plus interest.
Any interest payable under this paragraph shall accrue on the amounts expended from the
date of expenditure at the same rate as specified for interest on investments of the
Hazardous Substance Superfund established under subchapter A of chapter 98 of Title
26.
(B) If the President refuses to grant all or part of a petition made under this paragraph, the
petitioner may within 30 days of receipt of such refusal file an action against the
President in the appropriate United States district court seeking reimbursement from the
Fund.
(C) Except as provided in subparagraph (D), to obtain reimbursement, the petitioner shall
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not liable for response costs under
section 9607(a) of this title and that costs for which it seeks reimbursement are
reasonable in light of the action required by the relevant order.
(D) A petitioner who is liable for response costs under section 9607(a) of this title may
also recover its reasonable costs of response to the extent that it can demonstrate, on the
administrative record, that the President's decision in selecting the response action
ordered was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise not in accordance with law.
Reimbursement awarded under this subparagraph shall include all reasonable response
costs incurred by the petitioner pursuant to the portions of the order found to be arbitrary
and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law.
(E) Reimbursement awarded by a court under subparagraph (C) or (D) may include
appropriate costs, fees, and other expenses in accordance with subsections (a) and (d) of
section 2412 of Title 28."Id.
16 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 131; 42. U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607, 9613 (2000).
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The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, and
DuPont petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.1 7 Upon granting
DuPont's writ, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for the Third Circuit to review in the context of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Atlantic Research Corp. v. US.'8
Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that, under Atlantic Research Corp., a
PRP may seek relief under § 107(a) to recover for its cleanup costs, and
that § 113 is not the only remedy available to the PRP.19 The Third
Circuit ultimately reversed the District Court's decision regarding any
claim by DuPont for recovery of costs from its voluntary site cleanup, and
remanded the case to the District Court. 20
HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Enacted in 1980, CERCLA governs the "liability, compensation,
cleanup, and emergency response" associated with releasing hazardous
substances into the environment and inactive hazardous waste disposal site
cleanups.21 The main goals of CERCLA are to promote quick cleanup of
uncontrolled hazardous waste facilities and to ensure that owners and
operators of hazardous waste facilities assume the responsibility and costs
related to cleaning up the contamination generated by their facilities.22
Sections 106 and 107 cover administrative orders and cost recovery
actions respectively. 23 Contribution actions between PRPs are addressed
" DuPont, 508 F.3d at 131 (citing DuPont, 460 F.3d at 528; E.I DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. U.S., 127 S.Ct. 2971, 168 L.Ed.2d 701 (2007)).8 Id. (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S., 127 S.Ct. 2971, 168 L.Ed.2d 701
(2007)); Atlantic Research Corp. v. U.S., 127 S.Ct. 2331 (2007).
'9 Id. at 135.
20 Id. at 136.
21 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (1980).
22 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 135 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(k)(6)(E)); see also 131 CONG.
REc. 24725, 24730 (1985) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
23 Brent J. Horton, CERCLA's Contribution Provision: Must a PRP First Face an
Administrative Order or Cost Recovery Action? A Proposal for Amendment, 53
SYRACUSE L. REv. 209, 212 (2003).
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in § 113.24 Section 120 discusses waiver of the U.S. government's
sovereign immunity as to CERCLA suits.25
Section 106 authorizes the President to issue administrative orders
requiring PRPs, including government agencies and private parties, to
clean up the hazardous waste produced by their facilities.26 Also under §
106, the President may direct the U.S. Attorney General to obtain the
relief necessary to prevent danger to the environment or public health or
welfare posed by a facility's actual or potential release of hazardous
waste.27 Section 107(a)(1)-(4) of CERCLA sets forth the categories of
parties who are liable for costs associated with cleaning up hazardous
waste and defines the scope of their liability. 28 Under § 107, certain
parties can sue these PRPs to recover costs they incurred from cleaning up
the hazardous waste sites. 29
Section 113, adopted as part of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), was added to CERCLA in 1986.30 Under §
113(f), a PRP may bring a contribution suit against another PRP with
common liability arising from a § 106 or § 107(a) action to recover for an
"inequitable distribution" of that liability among those PRPs. 31 This mode
of recovery differs from § 107(a) in that § 107(a) does not allow a right to
contribution, but allows a party to recover costs resulting from that party's
own efforts in cleaning up a facility. 32 In short, the contribution and cost
recovery remedies offered under §§ 113(f) and 107(a), respectively, are
24 Id.
25 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 130.
26DuPont, 508 F.3d at 129; Saleel V. Sabnis, Aviall v. Cooper Industries: The Emerging
Controversy Behind CERCLA's Contribution Provision, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 261, 265-
66, n. 32 (2005).
27DuPont, 508 F.3d at 129; 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2000).
DuPont, 508 F.3d at 129; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4)(A)-(D) (2000); see note 7.
Horton, supra note 23 at 213-14. Such parties include the U.S. Government, a State,
an Indian tribe or "any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." Id.;
Sabnis, supra note 25 at 266.
"oDuPont, 508 F.3d at 129-30.
" Id. at 134.32Id.
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different and depend on the actions a party has undertaken and the party's
circumstances.
Finally, § 120(a)(1) waives the U.S.'s sovereign immunity against
CERCLA actions. 34 It states that CERCLA, including § 107, applies to
the U.S. government as it would to any other non-government party.3 5
The Third Circuit has held in the past that the government would be liable
for activities that would subject a private party to liability under CERCLA
also.36
A. Third Circuit Precedent and Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc.
Two Third Circuit decisions, New Castle County v. Halliburton
NUS Corp. and In re Reading Co., played major roles in the court's
reasoning leading up to the instant DuPont decision. It is important to
examine these two decisions to better understand the Third Circuit's
approach to analyzing the instant case. New Castle County involved an
appeal brought by a landfill owner, the company responsible for disposing
the landfill's hazardous waste, and another party in charge of the landfill's
disposal against the U.S. government. 37 The government initially filed
suit against the three parties under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), but modified it to include violations under
CERCLA to recover costs for remedial action the EPA took in response to
the landfill.3 8 The EPA hired Halliburton NUS Corporation to conduct a
study to determine the remedial course of action to take regarding the
3 Id. at 134-35. For example, if a PRP makes payment as part of a settlement agreement
or a court's judgment,
§ 113(f) allows that PRP to seek contribution from other parties with common liability
for that payment. Id. at 135. The PRP, however, cannot seek § 107(a) relief when paying
other parties back for their cleanup costs, because the PRP did not incur response costs of
its own. Id. Thus, although the PRP could seek § 113(f)(1) contribution relief, the same
PRP cannot concurrently pursue § 107(a) recovery for those same expenses. Id.
34 Id. at 130 (citing 42 U.S.C. 9620(a)(1) (2000)).
35 Id.
3 6 Id. (quoting FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994)
(en banc)).
3 New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1119 (3d Cir. 1997).38 id.
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landfill." NUS built monitoring wells, including Well TY-31 1, which
was used to inspect two groundwater formations. 40
New Castle claimed NUS installed TY-311 incorrectly, leading to
a "window" between the two groundwater formations41 and filed suit
against NUS under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B) to recover response costs
42New Castle had paid related to the landfill. NUS argued that New
Castle's claim was actually a CERCLA § 113(f)(1) contribution claim that
had expired under the three-year statute of limitations, and moved for
summary judgment. 4 3 The court dismissed the claim with prejudice, and
also dismissed New Castle's other common law negligence claim and
Delaware environmental law claims without prejudice to be filed in state
court.4
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that New Castle, as a PRP, could
bring suit under § 113(f) to recover contribution from other PRPs, but that
precisely because it was a PRP, New Castle may not use a § 107 claim to
recover costs from other PRPs. 45 The court stated that Congress likely
intended for § 107 to be used as a means for innocent parties, not PRPs, to
seek recovery of all of their cleanup costs; a suit brought by a PRP to
recoup cleanup costs exceeding its portion of the liability or to
"reapportion" cleanup costs between itself and another PRP constituted a §
39 id.
40 Id. One formation was shallow, and held groundwater containing landfill matter; the
other formation also contained groundwater, which was used as drinking water for New
Castle County. Id. The formations were separated by a clay strata known as
"Merchantville Formation;" New Castle believed the "window" in the Merchantville
formation could potentially be a "conduit" between the two other formations. Id.; New
Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 903 F.Supp. 771, 773 (D.Del. 1995).41 New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1119 (3d Cir. 1997).
New Castle also claimed that NUS was incorrect in concluding that the Merchantville
Formation was missing. Id.
42 id.
43 d
4 Id. at 1119-20. Count I claimed common law negligence for the "window" resulting
from the construction of Well TY-3 11 and for the improper analysis regarding the data
collected from the well. New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 903 F.Supp. 771,
773 (D. Del. 1995). Count III claimed NUS was also liable under the Delaware
Hazardous Substances Cleanup Act ("HSCA") for improper construction of the well
resulting in the "window." Id.45 New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122, 1124, 1126.
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113 contribution claim.46 The court further reasoned that it would be
illogical to allow a PRP held liable under § 107 to sue another PRP under
§ 107 to recover all its cleanup expenses, without regard to which party
was at fault.47
The Third Circuit decided In re Reading Co. shortly after New
Castle County.48 In In re Reading Co., Consolidated Rail Corporation
("Conrail") filed suit against Reading Railroad ("Reading"), demanding
contribution for any liability Reading might have related to waste sludge
spilling from a fifty-acre site in Douglassville, Pennsylvania into the
Schuylkill River during the 1970s. 49 The EPA deemed Reading a PRP
because Reading boxcars were used to transport sludge from
Douglassville pursuant to cleanup efforts.5 0 However, Reading was not
among the 36 PRPs ordered by the U.S. to partake in cleaning up the
Douglassville site nor did the U.S. seek recovery from Reading for costs
related to the U.S. response to the Douglassville cleanup.5 1 Conrail, by
contrast, was named among these 36 PRPs, and subsequently joined the
other PRPs in filing a third-party action against Reading and 600 other
PRPs to recover contribution for any liability Reading and the other 600
PRPs might have had related to the Douglassville spill. 52 Reading sought
an injunction, arguing that any liability it had in connection to the
Douglassville site was discharged as part of Reading's 1981 bankruptcy
proceedings in a consummation order protecting Reading from prior debts
and liabilities.5 3
The district court granted Reading injunctive relief, concluding
that contribution necessitated common liability between Reading and
Conrail to the U.S., and that the bankruptcy consummation order
discharged any liability Reading had to the U.S. warranting contribution to
Conrail.5 4 The U.S. and Conrail appealed to the Third Circuit.55 In its
46 Id. at 1120-22.
471d. at 1121.
48DuPont, 508 F.3d at 128.
491 In re Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (3d Cir. 1997).
s0 Id. at 1116.
51 Id.
52 id.
" Id. at 1114,1116.
54 Id. at 1116.
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decision, the Third Circuit addressed Conrail's four theories of recovery
against Reading: 1) § 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery; 2) § 113(f) contribution;
3) contribution under common law; and 4) restitution under common
law.56 The court held that CERCLA § 113(f) preempted Conrail's
common law contribution and restitution claims, and that CERCLA's
"plain meaning" requires a party seeking contribution to sue under §
113(f), not § 107(a)(4)(B).5 7 The court next evaluated Conrail's § 113(f)
claim in light of Reading's bankruptcy discharge.5 8  Referring to Third
Circuit precedent, the court found that Conrail's CERCLA claims were
not discharged as part of Reading's 1981 bankruptcy consummation order
because SARA was enacted afterwards, in 1986; thus, there was no way
for Conrail to statutorily assert contribution liability against Reading at the
time of Reading's bankruptcy consummation order in 1981 .59 However,
although Conrail's § 113(f) claim was not discharged, the Third Circuit
ultimately held that it could not stand.60  The court stated that Conrail's
contribution claim required that Reading be liable to the U.S. pursuant to §
55 Id.Id. at 1117.
1 Id. at 1117, 1120. The court found that § 113(f), as "an express provision" addressing
contribution, "trumps" § 107(a)(4)(B) in claims regarding the apportionment of cleanup
expenditures. Id. at 1117.
" Id. at 1121.
59 Id. at 1121-23. The Third Circuit referred to its decisions in Schweitzer v.
Consolidated Rail Corp. and In re Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. ("Paoli Yard"). Id. In
Schweitzer, the court held that employees' asbestos-injury claims against Reading were
not discharged because the injuries driving the claims did not appear until after Reading's
bankruptcy consummation order. Id. In Paoli Yard, since CERCLA had not been
enacted at the time of Penn Central Transportation Company's (PCTC) bankruptcy
consummation order, the court found that petitioners' CERCLA claims could not have
been discharged by the order because there was no basis for CERCLA liability at the time
the order was issued. Id. at 1121-22. In both Schweitzer and Paoli Yard, the court
rejected the idea that there were "contingent claims," or claims allowing a plaintiff to
recover as a creditor in bankruptcy proceedings, that were discharged. Id. Because a
legal relationship needs to exist between plaintiff and defendant in order for a contingent
claim to be discharged in bankruptcy, and Schweitzer was a personal injury tort case
while Paoli Yard involved a CERCLA-related claim brought before CERCLA's
enactment, neither case had the requisite legal relationship for a contingent claim
discharge; thus, there were no contingent claims to be discharged by the bankruptcy
consummation orders. Id. at 1121-22, 1125.
60 Id. at 1123.
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107(a). 6 ' Guided by the standards set in its Schweitzer and Paoli Yard
precedents, the court found that because the U.S.'s claim against Reading
existed and had accrued during the period of the bankruptcy proceedings,
the U.S.'s claim was discharged as part of the bankruptcy consummation
order. 62  Thus, because Reading was not liable to the U.S., the Third
Circuit held that, as a matter of law, Conrail's § 113(f) contribution claim
against Reading ultimately could not proceed.6
The U.S. Supreme Court's Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc.
decision undermined the Third Circuit's precedents, and required a party
to have been sued under § 106 or § 107(a) in order to qualify for §
1 13(f)(1) contribution relief.64 In Cooper, Cooper Industries owned four
aircraft engine maintenance sites which it sold to Aviall. 65 After several
years, Aviall found that Cooper Industries and Aviall had both
contaminated the site with petroleum seeping into the ground and
groundwater.66 Aviall cleaned up the properties after contacting and being
instructed to do so by the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission. 67 Although Aviall eventually sold the facilities, it continued
remedial efforts, totaling cleanup costs of about $5 million.68
Aviall filed suit against Cooper to recoup cleanup costs under
CERCLA § 107(a) and § 113(f)(1) separately, as well as state-law claims,
but then combined the CERCLA claims into one under § 113(f)(1). 69 The
61 Id. at 1124 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A, cmt. B. (1977), "[a]pplying
this traditional meaning of contribution to the current case, we conclude that Reading's
liability to Conrail depends on Reading's liability to the United States. To be liable for
contribution, Reading must be liable to the United States under § 107(a).").
62 Id. at 1125.
63 Id. at 1126.
6 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 133-34. The Third Circuit's Reading and New Castle County
decisions assumed that § 113(f) relief could be sought by all PRPs, whether the PRPs had
been sued or had voluntarily admitted to their liability. Id. at 133. In Cooper Indus.,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 113(f) was available only to a party who
had actually been held liable - not to a party who had admitted to being a PRP but whose
liability had not been determined. Id. at 133.
65 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 (2004).
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District Court held that Aviall could not receive relief under § 1 13(f)(1)
because Aviall had not been subject to a claim under §§ 106 or 107.70 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, but then reversed on rehearing, holding that §
113(f)(1) does permit a PRP to seek contribution from other PRPs,
whether or not the PRPs had been subjected to a § 106 or § 107 claim.7 '
However, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Aviall had no §
1 13(f)(1) claim because it had not been sued under § 106 or § 107(a).72
B. The Third Circuit's 2006 DuPont decision
The Third Circuit made its first DuPont decision in the aftermath
of Cooper Indus.73 As discussed above, DuPont and two other parties
sought recovery from the U.S. for expenses incurred as part of their
hazardous waste cleanup efforts of 15 sites co-owned by the U.S. 74
DuPont filed suit against the U.S. under CERCLA §§ 107(a) and 113(f)(1)
to recoup costs from its voluntary cleanup efforts, and for the portion
representing the U.S.'s share of the pollution.75 DuPont dismissed its §
107(a) claim and the district court subsequently granted the U.S.'s
7 0 Id. at 165.
7' Id.721 d. at 165-66, 168. The Court examined the text of § 113(f)(1), finding that the natural
meanings of the first sentence "[a]ny person may seek contribution.. .during or following
any civil action under Section 9606... [or] 9607(a) of this title" and the word "may"
indicated that contribution actions can be pursued only "during" or "following" an action
under § 106 or § 107, and that only those contribution actions meeting this condition are
allowed. Id. at 165-66. The Court discussed the last sentence of § 113(f)(1), also known
as the savings clause, which states: "Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of
any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under
section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title." Id. at 166. The Court interpreted
this as Congress's acknowledgement that other claims for contribution may be available
outside of § 113(f), and that this rebuts any presumption that § 113(f) is the only
contribution remedy for a PRP. Id. at 166-67. However, the Court also explicitly notes
that § 113(f) does not define what contribution claims would be available besides §
113(0, nor defines itself as a cause of action, and does not enlarge the scope of §
113(0(1) to include contribution claims unaccompanied by or not resulting from a § 106
or § 107 action. Id. at 167.
7 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S., 460 F.3d 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2006).




summary judgment motion, indicating that § 113(f) required DuPont to
have been sued before it could seek contribution relief from the U.S. 76
DuPont appealed to the Third Circuit, but the court reaffirmed the district
court, stating that its New Castle County and Reading decisions denied
DuPont relief for its voluntary cleanups.7 7
The Third Circuit's dissent acknowledged that the majority opinion
honored the court's New Castle County and Reading precedents; however,
the dissent indicated that intervening authority, such as the U.S. Supreme
Court's Coo er Indus. decision required the district court to revisit its
precedents. Specifically, the dissent noted that Cooper Indus. allowed §
113(f) claims to be brought by parties held responsible by the EPA, but
not, however, by parties who admit their responsibility, but had not had
their responsibility adjudicated or settled. 79 However, in its New Castle
County and Reading precedents, the Third Circuit erroneously interpreted
"potentially responsible parties" entitled to recovery under § 113(f) as
encompassing both previously adjudicated parties and parties who
admitted their liability voluntarily.8 Additionally, the dissent observed
that, unlike DuPont, the plaintiffs in New Castle County and Reading had
been sued before they sought contribution relief; DuPont, on the other
hand, undertook cleanup efforts voluntarily. 8  The Second and Eighth
Circuits also reconsidered some of their precedents in light of Cooper
Indus. and allowed § 107(a) cost recovery claims by parties undertaking
voluntary cleanups for which they may be liable. 82 Finally, the dissent
76Id.; DuPont, 460 F.3d 515, 525-26 (3d Cir. 2006). DuPont voluntarily dismissed its §
107(a) claim in adherence to the Third Circuit's prior New Castle Co. and Reading
decisions. Id.
n DuPont, 460 F.3d at 518. Specifically, the Third Circuit concluded that New Castle
Co. deemed § 113(f) to be the exclusive remedy for PRPs seeking contribution, as
opposed to § 107(a) providing PRPs cost recovery relief also; in Reading, the Third
Circuit stated that § 113(f) contribution claims were the exclusive contribution remedy
available to PRPs, superseding any common law claims for contribution. Id. The court
also indicated that because DuPont was a PRP and had cleaned up the sites voluntarily,
they could not pursue a contribution claim against other PRPs. Id.
78 Id. at 545-46.
7 Id. at 546-47.
'
0 Id. at 546.
" Id. at 547.8 2 Id. at 547-48.
567
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. 3
pointed out that CERCLA's main purpose of combating the U.S.'s
hazardous waste pollution problem depended heavily on voluntary
cleanups; the dissent expressed concern that the majority's holding would
discourage parties from undertaking voluntary cleanups by the possibility
of being denied contribution relief. 83
C. The Intervening Decision: Atlantic Research Corp. v. U.S.
In Atlantic Research Corp., Atlantic Research Corp., a PRP,
voluntarily cleaned up contamination at one of its sites jointly used and
polluted by the United States. 84 Atlantic Research Corp. cleaned up the
site even though it had not been adjudicated under CERCLA §§ 106 or
107, and sought recovery for the U.S.'s share of the cleanup costs under§§ 107(a) and 113(f).85 The U.S. Supreme Court held that § 113(f) could
not be a source of relief because Atlantic Research Corp. had not been
subject to suit under §§ 106 or 107, but that Atlantic could seek recovery
under § 107(a).8  The Court defined §§ 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f)(1) as
separate remedies complementary to each other, stating that the
availability of each remedy depended on the circumstances of the PRP.87
Section 107(a) provides recovery to a private party or PRP only for the
cleanup costs that party itself incurred. Section 113(f) allows a PRP to
bring a contribution action against another jointly liable PRP, following a
suit under §§ 106 or 107, to recover from that PRP cleanup costs
proportionate to its liability. 89
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
As ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court, given its recent Atlantic
Research Corp. v. U.S. decision, the Third Circuit began its analysis by
" Id. at 549-50.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S, 508 F.3d 126, 134 (3d Cir. 2007).85 id.





reviewing its prior E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S. holding. 90
Under Atlantic Research Corp., § 107 of CERCLA allows a party to
recover costs incurred for its voluntary hazardous waste cleanup from
another party, even the government, without being liable to a third party.91
However, the Third Circuit had concluded the opposite in its 2006 DuPont
decision, finding that DuPont could not seek recovery for a portion of its
cleanup costs from the U.S. under § 107.92
The Third Circuit noted that its New Castle County and Reading
precedents barred DuPont's claims against the U.S. 93 In both cases, the
court found that a PRP could recover cleanup costs only under CERCLA §
113 . The court's decisions in these two cases were based on the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Cooper Indus., which restricted § 113
recovery to parties who were required under a court order or settlement
agreement to clean up sites contaminated with hazardous waste. 95 Since
DuPont had cleaned up the sites voluntarily, the Third Circuit concluded
in its prior DuPont decision that DuPont's recovery claim could not
stand.9 However, in the present case, the Third Circuit acknowledged the
U.S. Supreme Court's Atlantic Research Corp. decision as an intervening
authority, requiring the Third Circuit to reconsider its New Castle County
and Reading precedents since the basis for the holdings in those two
decisions was irreconcilable with Atlantic Research Corp.97
In its New Castle County decision, the Third Circuit joined the
trend of courts that cited § 113, instead of § 107, as the means for a PRP to
seek reimbursement of costs exceeding its portion of site cleanup costs.98
The court also admitted to reading into § 107 an innocence requirement
for parties bringing suit to recoup cleanup costs; the court acknowledged
90 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 127; the Third Circuit's prior decision was E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. U.S., 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006).
9' Id. at 128.
92 id.
9 Id.
94 1d. (citing New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir.
1997); Matter of Reading Co., 115 F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1997)).
9s Id. (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004)).
96 id.
97 Id. at 132.98 Id. at 133.
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this innocence standard overlooked the fact that "any other person," not
just the government, state or Indian tribes, could be a private party
plaintiff under § 107(a)(4)(B).99 The court stated it also held in Reading
that a PRP may not seek contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B), and that §
113(f)(1) provided a party not being sued under § 107 the opportunity to
bring an action for contribution. 00
In both its Reading and New Castle County decisions, the Third
Circuit was under the impression that both adjudicated PRPs and those
PRPs who admitted their liability voluntarily could seek contribution relief
under § 113.101 However, after the U.S. Supreme Court held in Cooper
Indus. that a PRP could not recoup cleaning costs under § 113(f) unless it
had been held liable, the Third Circuit changed its approach in analyzing
the 2006 DuPont case; it determined its precedents in New Castle County
and Reading, and the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper Indus. together
prevented PRPs that had not been adjudicated or settled their liability from
recovering for their cleanup costs under CERCLA.102
The Third Circuit noted that the Eighth Circuit considered Cooper
Indus. in its Atlantic Research Corp. v. U.S. decision also. 10 3 The results
of the Cooper Indus. decision denied Atlantic Research Corp. relief under§ 113 for its cleanup costs because Atlantic had not been adjudicated nor
entered into a settlement agreement.'0 In Dico Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., the
Eighth Circuit held that a PRP was not an innocent party and therefore
could not bring suit under § 107.105 However, on Atlantic's appeal and
given Cooper Indus., the Eighth Circuit felt it would be unjust to deny
Atlantic Research Corp. relief under § 107 on the ground that Atlantic had
not been subject to a suit or entered into a settlement agreement and the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.106




103 Id. at 133; Atlantic Research Corp. sought cleanup cost relief from the U.S. under
CERCLA §§ 107 and 113. Id. (citing Atlantic Research Corp. v. U.S., 459 F.3d 827 (8th
Cir. 2006)).
04DuPont, 508 F.3d at 134.




Observing the U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion in Atlantic
Research Corp., that any party, including PRPs, can seek cleanup cost
recovery relief under §107(a)(4)(B), the Third Circuit overruled its prior
DuPont decision deeming § 113 the only claim available to PRPs.10 7 The
Third Circuit noted that, since Atlantic Research Corp., PRPs may bring
suit under § 107 to recoup cleanup costs, and that § 113 was not their only
option. 08  The Third Circuit concluded that DuPont's § 107(a) claim,
although previously dismissed by DuPont, could proceed and the court
reversed and remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings.1 09
V. COMMENT
The Third Circuit's 2007 decision in E.L DuPont de Nemours &
Co. v. U.S. is a positive development and brings a sigh of relief not only
for DuPont as a PRP, but also for CERCLA jurisprudence as a whole 'and
for the public at large. Not only did the decision realign the Third Circuit
with the other circuits that had confronted similar § 107(a) cases in the
past, it also furthers one of CERCLA's main goals by allowing PRPs to
seek recovery for costs they incurred from undertaking voluntary
hazardous waste cleanup efforts." 0 To be sure, the case at bar will be one
of many to solidify this area of environmental law.
At first glance, it may seem that the Third Circuit is
"backpedaling" in the instant case. In its 2006 DuPont decision, the court
was firm in adhering to its New Castle Co. and Reading precedents, and
even recognized it veered off the "path" taken by other circuits in
choosing to prevent DuPont from seeking relief under § 107(a) for its
voluntary cleanup efforts."' Despite the fact that other circuits revisited
07 Id. at 135.
08 Id.
9 Id. at 135-36 n.6.
"
0 Id. at 135. CERCLA seeks "to assure that the current and future costs associated with
hazardous waste facilities.. .will be adequately financed and, to the greatest extent
Viossible, borne by the owners and operators of such facilities." Id.
"DuPont, 460 F.3d at 543, 547-48. Unlike the Third Circuit, the Second and Eighth
Circuits allowed PRPs to pursue cost recovery relief for their voluntary cleanups from
other PRPs under § 107(a). Id. at 547-48.
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their precedents in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's Cooper Indus.
decision and allowed § 107(a) cost recovery suits by PRPs who undertook
cleanup efforts on their own initiative, the Third Circuit remained
steadfast, driving a circuit split and raising questions by many.I12
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Atlantic Research
Corp., prompting the Third Circuit's reconsideration of its precedents in
the instant case.113 Interestingly, the dissent in the 2006 DuPont decision
foreshadowed the Third Circuit's decision in the present case, especially
in stating that New Castle County and Reading needed to be
reconsidered.11 4 The dissent also observed that the majority refused to
acknowledge a key factual difference between its New Castle Co. and
Reading precedents and the circumstances in DuPont: the plaintiffs in New
Castle Co. and Reading performed their cleanups in response to being
sued, and then filed suit to recover cleanup costs from other PRPs,
whereas DuPont conducted the cleanup voluntarily.11 5  Additionally,
many of the dissent's arguments in favor of allowing § 107(a) relief to
those who conduct voluntary cleanups were discussed in the present case
as well.11 6 In the end, however, any unfavorable perceptions associated
112 Id. at 547-48; Greek, supra note 3 at 685, 690.
11 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 128.
114 DuPont, 460 F.3d at 545-46. The dissent found that the U.S. Supreme Court's Cooper
Indus. weakened New Castle County and Reading because Cooper Indus. brought to light
the Third Circuit's misunderstanding of who is a "potentially responsible party" for §
113(f) recoupment purposes. Id. at 546-47. In its New Castle County and Reading
decisions, the Third Circuit was under the impression that all PRPs, whether they had
been sued or had admitted their liability voluntarily, could recuperate their cleanup costs
under § 113(f). DuPont, 508 F.3d 126, 133. However, Cooper Indus. clarified that §
113(f) is available only to those parties who had actually been held liable; parties who
admitted to being a PRP but had not been held liable could not seek relief under § 113(f).
Id.
us DuPont, 460 F.3d. at 547; Rachel E. Avey, Precedent versus Plain Meaning:
Resolving the CERCLA §107 Controversy after Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc.
46 Washburn L.J. 573, 596-97 (2007). In particular, New Castle County involved
plaintiffs seeking recovery for cleanups they conducted as ordered by an EPA consent
decree, and the cleanup performed by the plaintiff in Reading was in response to § 106
and § 107 suits. DuPont, 460 F.3d 515, 530 n. 19; Avey, supra at 597 n.2 10.
"
6 DuPont, 460 F.3d at 548-49; DuPont, 508 F.3d at 135. These arguments include:
"[P]ermitting parties who voluntarily incur cleanup costs to bring suit under § 107
comports with the fundamental purposes of CERCLA" and "The purpose of CERCLA is
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with "backpedaling" disappear because the Third Circuit rectified the
circuit split caused by its 2006 DuPont opinion with the instant decision,
thereby promoting stability in this area of CERCLA jurisprudence.
More importantly, this decision promotes voluntary cleanups,
which is central to CERCLA's purpose, benefiting the environment and
community at large.'" 7 This decision affords parties, including PRPs, two
different means of recouping their voluntary cleanup costs: § 107(a) cost
recovery or § 113(f) contribution." 8 Now, it is more likely that parties
will engage in voluntary cleanups, because these remedies provide
assurance that the parties will be able to recoup expenses incurred from
their voluntary cleanup efforts. Additionally, it is interesting to note that
the Fifth Circuit also remanded its controversial Cooper Indus. decision to
the Northern District Court of Texas, Dallas Division for reconsideration
within the context of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic
Research Corp."l9 Moreover, as recently as April 2008, the Ninth Circuit
overruled one of its prior decisions in light of Atlantic as well, and allowed
PRPs cleanup cost relief under § 107(a).120 In effect, it may be that the
Third Circuit is not the only one "backpedaling" as a result of the U.S.
Supreme Court's Atlantic Research Corp. decision.
'to assure that the current and future costs associated with hazardous waste facilities,
including post-closure costs, will be adequately financed and, to the greatest extent
possible, borne by the owners and operators of such facilities." Id.
"' DuPont, 508 F.3d at 135-36. Congress has stated, "[V]oluntary cleanups are essential
to a successful program for clean up of the Nation's hazardous substance pollution
problem." Id. at 135 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 5, at 58 (1985)).
1 DuPont, 508 F.3d at 134-35.
119 Aviall Serv., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., No. 06-10996, 2007 WL 1959147, at *1 (5th Cir.
2007).
120 Kotrous v. Goss-Jewett Co. of N. Cal., 523 F.3d. 924 (9th Cir. 2008). In its 1997
Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp. decision, the Ninth Circuit held that "§ 107
entitles PRPs to seek only contribution, not cost recovery, from other PRPs." Id. at 927.
The Ninth Circuit overruled Pinal Creek in its 2008 Kotrous decision, stating, "The
holding in Atlantic Research that a PRP may sue for cost recovery under § 107
undermines our holding in Pinal Creek that an action between PRPs is necessarily for
contribution... We therefore conclude that Pinal Creek's holding that an action between
PRPs is necessarily for contribution has been overruled." Id. at 932-33.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit caused quite a stir in 2006 when it departed from
its sister circuits and denied relief under § 107(a) to PRPs seeking
recoupment for voluntary cleanup costs. The U.S. Supreme Court's
subsequent Atlantic Research Corp. decision pressured the court to revisit
its prior analysis in DuPont, steering the Third Circuit toward the same
route taken by other circuits in allowing PRPs to seek § 107(a) relief for
their voluntary cleanup efforts. Not only will the Third Circuit's return to
the main "path" of CERCLA jurisprudence promote consistency and
stability in this area of the law, society as a whole will reap the benefits of
this decision in the form of a cleaner, safer environment resulting from
PRPs being incentivized to voluntarily cleanup hazardous waste at their
sites. The Third Circuit's 2007 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S.
decision shows that in some cases, backpedaling is not such a bad thing.
SHEILA M. NEEDLES
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